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Abstract 
Juror decision-making involves the individual’s evaluation of evidence in court. There are two 
major types of models: mathematical and explanation.  Both models make specific, contrasting 
assumptions of juror decision-making, but few studies have compared both models with the same 
experimental paradigm.  The current study compared information integration/Bayesian models 
mathematical) to story models (explanation) using the same paradigm.  A bias was introduced 
before evidence evaluation began.  Participants read one of three narratives designed to bias their 
perception of the defendant towards a guilty, innocent, or neutral stance.  Participants freely 
selected among six items of evidence (three eyewitnesses and three physical items), and each 
item had four additional sub-evidence items (two suggest guilt and two suggest innocence) they 
rated for guilt using a 10-point Likert scale.  Results from the study suggest jurors use a 
combination of both models when evaluating evidence, but the methodology forced participants 
to use Bayesian methods, making it difficult to interpret.  The bias introduced at the beginning of 
the study did not affect final verdict choice, and selection order did not affect the final verdict. 
However, there was a difference in selection order by condition, suggesting bias was present and 
influencing what items were selected. These findings suggest participants may have been 
inoculated against bias due to study methodology of making guilt ratings after each sub-evidence 
item. 
Keywords: Decision-making, Bayesian, information integration, story models, juror,  
predecisional distortion 
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A Test of Bayesian and Story Models on Juror Decision 
Most decision-making models originated from economics where the goal was to 
predict/explain how people choose among a set of options.  One of the most popular models is 
expected utility theory, and it focuses on cost-benefit models where the decision maker should 
choose the option that results in the highest payoff (expected utility/value) for themselves (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Schoemaker, 1982).  Models like expected utility assume the 
decision maker uses logic when assessing available options, especially when the outcome of the 
decision impacts them.  However, these models are a poor fit for decisions where the decision 
maker must choose an option for another individual (e.g., person A must decide whether person 
B does X or Y).  They were not designed for situations like this, and they raise questions about 
how a decision maker may choose for another person, such as in criminal trials.  The Court 
Statistics Project (CSP) reported that 17.8 million criminal cases were reported in the United 
States during 2016 (CSP, 2018).  Not all reported cases will go to trial.  For each reported 
criminal case, there was an individual deciding if enough probable cause existed to bring the case 
to trial, if the case should be dismissed, whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty, or what 
the sentence should be if found guilty.  Decision makers in these situations (i.e. jurors, judges) 
must decide on limited information and the decision will affect another person.  Because the final 
decision has no obvious impact on the decision maker, it is important to understand how jurors 
evaluate evidence and what factors influence their evaluation and decision process. 
Juror Decision Making Models 
Traditional juror decision making models propose that jurors begin with an initial 
assessment and adjust the assessment as each new item is introduced.  Anchoring and adjustment 
are common when the decision involves ambiguity, and each new item adjusts the initial 
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assessment (the anchor) toward certainty or uncertainty between two options (Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1985).  This is done in an attempt to remove ambiguity and determine the best decision 
given the information.  However, not all juror decision-making models are based on this anchor 
and adjustment technique.  There are two main juror decision making models that attempt to 
explain how jurors evaluate evidence: mathematical models (Bayesian and information 
integration models) and explanation models (story model) (McCullough, 2007).  Bayesian, 
information integration, and story models are the three of the most known decision-making 
models, and they differ in their explanation of juror decision-making and how item weight (or 
perception of guilt) is combined to choose a verdict. 
Bayesian models assume each item of evidence is independent of the next with no 
influence on subsequent items (Rust, Inman, & Zahorik, 1998).  The weight of evidence is used 
to adjust the overall average of information and is evaluated independently, but Bayesian models 
consider the accuracy of items of evidence to represent the actual event (Einhorn, Hogarth, & 
Klempner, 1977; Schum & Du Charme, 1971).  Jurors are faced with the question of whether the 
evidence presented in court is representative of events that transpired in commission of the 
crime.  Jurors have no way to assess the credibility of evidence other than from testimony 
provided by both sides of the court.  They may pull from prior knowledge or opinion to 
determine the weight of items to remove ambiguity about the information, but each item is 
assessed independently of the others (Marshall & Wise, 1975; Schum & Du Charme, 1971; 
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985).  Prior knowledge and context for some items may influence the 
weight of the item differently between jurors, thus affecting how they weigh the evidence (Kaye 
& Koehler, 2003).  For example, juror A may weigh the testimony of an eyewitness less than 
juror B because they know eyewitness testimony is not very reliable.  Although Bayesian models 
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consider the accuracy of evidence presented in court and juror attempts to make accurate 
determinations, they do not consider the influence of previous items on subsequent items 
presented during trial (Carlson & Russo, 2001); items are independent and assume no causality 
between them.   
Information integration models assume that an averaging effect happens as items are 
introduced with the average value for guilty/not guilty being adjusted as additional items are 
introduced (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985; Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, 
1978).  Criminal trials usually involve some ambiguity about the crime, and jurors are often 
tasked with integrating individual pieces of information to determine the defendant’s role, which 
makes use of the anchoring and adjusting process.  Information integration models assume 
individual items of evidence are weighted differently in their indication of guilt/not guilty, and it 
is the varying weight of individual items that contribute to the overall average computed by 
jurors (Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; Schum & Du Charme, 1971).  Jurors adjust their average as 
additional items are introduced to integrate multiple items, but item A does not influence the 
weight of item B or D, or vice versa.  Each item’s weight contributes to the overall average 
weight of guilty/not guilty without influencing the next item. Mathematical equations are a 
hallmark of Bayesian and information integration models and are predictive of juror decisions, 
but they do not incorporate any psychological concepts that may explain how jurors choose their 
final outcome. 
Story model appears to address many of the factors ignored by information integration 
and Bayesian models and is one of the current leading models for juror decision making (Carlson 
& Russo, 2001; Pennington & Hastie, 1981; Willmott, Boduszeck, Debowska, & Woodfield, 
2018).  Other juror decision making models address different components of decision making 
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and tend to ignore courtroom procedures and juror tasks (Pennington & Hastie, 1981).  
Pennington and Hastie (1986) proposed the story model of juror decision making, suggesting 
jurors construct mental narratives of events that took place leading to the crime as items of 
evidence are introduced in trial to create a story of likely events that occurred.  Multiple 
narratives may be constructed by jurors (i.e. guilty or innocent narrative) from evidence 
introduced in court, and each narrative is continuously adjusted as additional information is 
provided.  As the trial progresses, jurors compare each narrative with possible verdicts and match 
the best explanation to a final verdict.  Evidence presented in a story format has been shown to 
lead to better understanding of events, suggesting jurors attempt to combine individual items of 
evidence into a cohesive story to assist with decision making in criminal trials (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992; Wiener, Richmond, Seib, Rauch, & Hackney, 2002).  Although there is support for 
story model, it may be too simple to account for the complex nature of juror decision making 
because jurors have been found to use multiple story structures to construct narratives about 
mock murder cases (Wiener et al., 2002). The story model also cannot account for early verdict 
determinations in trials (Carlson & Russo, 2001).  Additionally, items in court generally are not 
presented in chronological order and typically follow a question/answer format, which does not 
allow for easy or logical story construction. 
Predecisional Distortion and Order Effects 
There are other factors that may provide an explanation for how jurors arrive at their final 
verdict outside those proposed by decision making models.  Graphic images, emotions, detail of 
eyewitness testimony, and the presence of facial tattoos affect jurors’ decision making and 
influence final verdicts and sentences (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Douglas, Lyon, & 
Ogloff, 1997; Bell & Loftus, 1985).  Many of these factors influence jurors without their 
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conscious awareness, functioning as implicit biases and affecting their motives and decisions 
throughout the trial.  One such factor influencing jurors is the concept of predecisional distortion: 
a dominant stance towards guilty or not guilty is assumed early in trial by jurors and evaluation 
of subsequent evidence introduced following the development of the stance are done in such a 
manner where it corresponds with and supports the dominant stance (Carlson & Russo, 2001; 
Dahlstrand & Montgomery, 1984; Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996).  Predecisional distortion is a 
concern in trials because jurors are typically instructed to avoid making determinations of guilt 
until all evidence has been presented, and varying decision selection strategies may exist when 
the goals of each juror vary (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,1988).  If jurors create a dominant 
stance or preference towards one verdict at the beginning of a trial, decision strategies used later 
when evaluating evidence may differ between jurors with an opposite or neutral stance and may 
affect the final verdict.  
It is important to note most legal systems in the United States follow set procedures that 
dictate when each side of a criminal trial is permitted to present their case and subsequent 
evidence, which poses challenges to the story model.  It is uncommon for either side of a 
criminal trial to present evidence in chronological order, so courtroom procedures are not 
inherently conducive to the story model’s goal of a cohesive narrative.  Courtroom procedures 
appear to favor information integration and Bayesian models.  However, courtroom procedures 
do allow jurors to combine individual pieces of evidence and testimony with their own thoughts 
and feelings to construct a narrative that makes sense to them (Pennington & Hastie, 1986), even 
if they must do so on their own during deliberation.  The procedures are designed to eliminate 
any bias or advantage for either side of a criminal trial to ensure fairness, but presentation order 
has been found to influence verdicts in mock trials.  Recency effects have been found when guilt 
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provoking evidence is shown last (Charman, Carbone, Kekessie, & Villalba, 2016; Enescu & 
Kuhn, 2012), suggesting it may be advantageous to present the most convincing evidence last, 
and some procedures may benefit one side over the other and may affect the final verdict or 
sentence (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2005). 
Order effects become increasingly concerning when predecisional distortion is 
considered.  Information integration and Bayesian models of juror decision making generally 
assume independence between items and do not place much weight on prior opinions in 
determining the average weight of guilty/not guilty information (Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; 
Marshall & Wise, 1975; Rust et al., 1998; Schum & Du Charme, 1971).  They cannot account for 
predecisional distortion in their basic design because they do not assume causality between items 
and treat each item as an individual contributor.  Decision selection strategies are also known to 
differ depending on the goal of the decision maker (Payne et al., 1988), and it is possible that 
predecisional distortion affects decision strategies used by the decision maker when the 
presentation order of evidence is varied.  Story model may be able to explain order effects and 
predecisional distortion, although it has been argued the story model’s reliance on prior verdict 
category knowledge cannot account for distortion effects until the very end (Carlson & Russo, 
2001).  Bayesian models do explain and predict individual item evaluation, but it cannot explain 
how the weight of item C influences item D’s weight.  Additionally, it is unclear how freedom of 
selection affects evidence evaluation and predecisional distortion when considering decision 
making models. 
Current Study 
The current study aims to investigate decision strategies that may arise during the 
evidence evaluation process while also investigating predecisional distortion within a mock 
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criminal trial.  Bayesian, information integration, and story models will serve as the basic 
theories for comparison to determine whether one better explains mock juror decision making 
and can account for predecisional distortion.  Because information integration and Bayesian 
models make similar predictions of independence, they will be combined for the purpose of this 
study, whereas the story model predicts an interdependence between items.  Additionally, the 
study addresses previous literature regarding order effects on juror decision making and how 
freedom of choice may affect juror decisions regarding evidence evaluation.  It addresses 
whether initial information about a criminal case prior to evidence evaluation affects subsequent 
evaluations and decision strategies while assessing freedom of choice on selection order.  
Participants served as mock jurors and evaluate main items of evidence and sub-evidence items 
from a mock court case used previously by Skolnick and Shaw (2001) and Seckinger (1992).  
Based on the aforementioned theories, if selection patterns are found within each narrative type 
the story model would be supported; however, if no selection patterns are found information 
integration and Bayesian models would be supported.  In a similar vein, if a relationship is found 
between evidence guilt and selection order (i.e. guilt rating for the first selected item predicts 
subsequent items’ guilt rating) the story model would be supported; no relationship between 
evidence ratings and selection order would support information integration and Bayesian models.  
It is predicted that the story model will be used over the Bayesian model, and that the story 
model will reflect predecisional distortion and order effects. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and three participants were recruited from introductory psychology courses 
at the University of Central Oklahoma through Sona Systems for partial fulfillment of course 
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credit.  Software crashes during data collection resulted in 93 participants for inclusion in data 
analysis (29 males, 64 females).  Participants ranged in age from 18 to 28 years of age (M = 
19.38, SD = 1.73).  Forty-eight participants reported their ethnicity as Caucasian/White (51.6%), 
16 reported being African American/Black (17.2%), 10 reported being Hispanic/Latino (10.8%), 
7 reported being Native American/Alaskan Native (7.5%), 5 reported being Asian/Pacific 
Islander (5.4%), and 7 reported as Other (7.5%).  Only one participant indicated they previously 
served on a jury. 
Materials 
A modified narrative from a hypothetical criminal case based on the work of Skolnick 
and Shaw (2001) and Seckinger (1992) is used as the mock crime for this study (see Appendix 
A).  The criminal case involves a man (the defendant) who is charged with murdering his ex-
wife, and six items are presented (three eyewitnesses and three physical items of evidence) that 
are used to assist with making a guilty/not guilty verdict.  The narrative is modified to create 
three different stances towards the defendant by altering the length of his divorce from his ex-
wife (recently divorced, divorced several years ago, or no mention of divorce).  The narratives do 
not contain many details for the purpose of allowing participants to base their decision on the 
provided evidence.  Actual photos are not included to eliminate any potential bias known to 
originate from graphic images (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Douglas et al., 1997).  No 
images accompany the witnesses.  Each item of evidence has four sub-evidence items that 
provide additional information about the specific item.  Two sub-evidence items suggest guilt, 
while the remaining two sub-evidence items suggest the defendant may be innocent.  A 10-point 
Likert scale is used to rate each sub-evidence item for guilt by sliding a bar either to the left (Not 
Guilty) or the right (Very Guilty).  The sub-evidence is no longer visible after it is rated, and the 
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process is repeated until all sub-evidence items are selected and rated.  The item of evidence 
relating to the sub-evidence is also no longer visible once its sub-evidence items are reviewed.  A 
10-point Likert scale is also used to rate decision confidence (left Not Confident, right Very 
Confident) once all items and sub-evidence have been reviewed.  The ratings represent how their 
stance towards the defendant and overall guilt is changing throughout the study when viewing 
different items of evidence (see Appendix B for an overview).  
Procedure 
Participants are randomly assigned to read one of three narratives about the defendant 
and his preliminary guilt (Guilty, Innocent, or Neutral condition) prior to beginning the 
study.  Informed consent is obtained from participants, and the researcher provides participants 
with verbal instructions to follow all instructions presented on the computer and to ask questions 
at any time.  Participants are directed towards the computer to begin, and the researcher remains 
in the room while participants complete the study.   
Participants advance to the next screen and read a brief narrative about the crime 
surrounded by six icons representing the six items of main evidence (stepmother’s testimony, 
neighbor’s testimony, bartender’s testimony, knife, car, and footprint).  These icons are visible at 
once to allow participants to choose freely among them.  Participants decide the order icons are 
selected based on their perceived importance, beginning with the most important and ending with 
the least important. Each icon has four sub-evidence items that provide additional information 
about the selected item.  Participants select sub-evidence in any order they wish, beginning with 
the most important and ending with the least important.  Participants make a guilt rating for each 
sub-evidence on a Likert scale (left Not Guilty, right Very Guilty) before they may select the 
next sub-evidence.  Once all four sub-evidence is viewed and the fourth guilt rating is made, 
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participants return to the original screen with the five remaining evidence icons.  Participants 
repeat the process until all six icons are viewed and all sub-evidence items are rated. 
Participants complete a distractor paper folding task after viewing all items and have two 
minutes to complete the task.  Participants are directed back to the computer after the task and 
continue to the next screen to indicate how confident they are in their decision on a Likert scale 
(left Not Confident, right Very Confident).  Participants advance to the next screen where they 
make a final guilty/not guilty verdict, followed by a debriefing statement.  Participants complete 
a demographic questionnaire after reading the debriefing and asks the researcher any questions 
before they are dismissed.  Selection order, guilt rating, final verdict, and response time are 
recorded throughout the study. 
Results 
Condition and Final Verdict 
When collapsed across all three conditions, 59.14% of participants found the defendant 
guilty and 40.86% found the defendant innocent.  A two-tailed chi-square test of independence 
was performed to analyze the relationship between condition (Guilty, Innocent, and Neutral) and 
final verdict outcome (Guilty and Innocent).  There was no significant association between 
narratives read by participants and the final verdict outcome, ꭓ2 (2) = .44, p = .803 (see Appendix 
C for verdict outcomes).  The bias introduced in the narrative at the beginning of the study did 
not sway participants toward one verdict over the other. 
Main Evidence, Selection Order, and Condition 
A two-tailed chi-square test of independence was performed to analyze the relationship 
between selection order (1st – 6th) and condition (Guilty, Innocent, and Neutral) among items of 
main evidence (see Appendix A).  No significant associations were found between selection 
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order and condition (Selection Order 1: ꭓ2 (10) = 13.96, p = .175; Selection Order 2: ꭓ2 (10) = 
16.34, p = .090; Selection Order 3: ꭓ2 (10) = 18.31, p = .050; Selection Order 4: ꭓ2 (10) = 4.76, p 
= .906; Selection Order 5: (10) = 10.83, p = .371; Selection Order 6: ꭓ2 (10) = 12.45, p = 
.256).  To correct for missing cell frequencies in the chi-square analysis, items of main evidence 
were collapsed by eyewitness testimony (stepmother, neighbor, and bartender) and physical 
evidence (knife, footprint, and car).  A chi-square test of independence was performed to analyze 
the relationship between eyewitness testimony and physical evidence selection order (1st – 6th) by 
condition (Guilty, Innocent, and Neutral).  A significant association was found between the 
second selected eyewitness testimony and physical evidence (ꭓ2(2) = 7.388, p < .05; Cramer’s V 
= .282).  Appendix D shows the percentage that eyewitness testimony and physical evidence 
were selected by condition.  In all three conditions, physical evidence was selected first; 
however, a different pattern was found for participants’ second selection.  For this second 
selection, a one-way MANOVA with a Gabriel post hoc test was performed to analyze the 
difference between condition (Guilty, Innocent, and Neutral) and type of main evidence 
(eyewitness testimony and physical evidence).  A significant difference between condition and 
the second selected item was found (F(2, 90) = 3.883, p < .05; Wilks’ Λ = .921).  Physical 
evidence was selected second 34% of the time in the Guilty condition compared to 68% of the 
time in the Innocent condition, but there was no significant difference between the Neutral 
condition (52% physical evidence, 48% eyewitness testimony) and either group.  The difference 
in selection patterns between the Guilty and Innocent conditions suggest that the bias introduced 
at the beginning of the study influenced how items were selected. 
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Selection Order, Sub-Evidence, and Guilt 
Sub-evidence guilt ratings were combined to create an average rating for each selection 
order (1st – 6th) by sub-evidence type (Guilty and Innocent), resulting in the creation of 12 
variables for comparison.  The average guilt ratings were used for the following analyses.  A 2 
(sub-evidence type: Guilty and Innocent) x 6 (selection order: 1st – 6th) x 3 (condition: Guilty, 
Innocent, and Neutral) mixed MANOVA with a Gabriel post hoc test was performed to analyze 
the difference in guilt ratings.  Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was violated for selection order 
(Mauchly’s W = .702, p < .05) and sub-evidence type by order (Mauchly’s W = .756, p < .05), 
and Greenhouse-Geisser was used. There was a significant interaction between sub-evidence 
type and selection order (F(2, 90) = 3.57, p < .05, η2 = .03, Wilks’ Λ = .863) on sub-evidence 
guilt, but no other significant interactions were found between the remaining variables.  There 
was no significant difference by condition (F(1, 90) = 1.467, p = .236) or selection order (F(4.43, 
90) = 2.28, p = .053; Wilks’ Λ = .9) on sub-evidence guilt.  There was a significant difference by 
sub-evidence type (F(1, 90) = 298.66, p < .001, η2 = .77; Wilks’ Λ = .232) on sub-evidence 
guilt.  Guilty and innocent sub-evidence were rated differently within the conditions, confirming 
that they were successful in suggesting guilt or innocence of the defendant.  Condition (Guilty, 
Innocent, and Neutral) and selection order (1st – 6th) did not affect guilt ratings, which shows no 
support for bias or order effects.  However, selection order did affect guilt ratings when sub-
evidence type was considered; innocent sub-evidence items increased in guilt across selection 
order (see Appendix E). 
To see if guilt ratings differed for sub-evidence, a 2 (sub-evidence type: Guilty and 
Innocent) x 6 (selection order: 1st – 6th) x 2 (final verdict: Guilty and Innocent) mixed MANOVA 
with a Gabriel post hoc test was performed.  Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant for 
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selection order (Mauchly’s W = .71, p <.05) but not for selection order by sub-evidence type 
(Mauchly’s W = .775, p = .065), and Greenhouse-Geisser was used.  There was a significant 
difference by verdict (F(1, 91) = 33.49, p < .001, η2 = .27) and sub-evidence type (F(1, 91) = 
293.17, p < .001, η2 = .76; Wilks’ Λ = .237) on sub-evidence guilt.  Guilty verdicts had higher 
guilt ratings (M = 5.38) than Innocent verdicts (M = 4.37), which is expected.  Guilty and 
innocent sub-evidence were rated differently within the conditions, revealing the guilt and 
innocent sub-evidence influenced perception toward the defendant.  Selection order, verdict, and 
sub-evidence type did not affect guilt ratings, revealing there were no order effects when 
considering verdict and sub-evidence type. 
To determine whether a relationship existed between sub-evidence guilt ratings and 
selection order, a two-tailed Spearman’s rho correlation was performed.  Significant 
relationships were found between guilt ratings and selection order (see Appendix F).  In general, 
guilty items tended to correlate with other guilty items, and innocent items tended to correlate 
with other innocent items.  Bayesian and information integration models assume items have no 
relationship with each other, and the presence of relationships between multiple items of 
evidence is opposite of what is expected with these models.  The presence of a significant 
relationship supports the story model and provides support for the likelihood of predecisional 
distortion being present. 
Confidence and Final Verdict 
A 2 (final verdict: Guilty and Innocent) x 3 (condition: Guilty, Innocent, and Neutral) 
ANOVA with a Gabriel post hoc test was performed to analyze the difference between 
confidence ratings. A significant difference was found between verdict (F(1, 87) = 5.926, p < 
.05), but not condition (F(2, 87) = .251, p = .778). Guilty verdicts had higher confidence ratings 
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(M = 6.6) than Innocent verdicts (M = 5.58).  Condition (Guilty, Innocent, and Neutral) did not 
affect confidence ratings, suggesting the bias introduced at the beginning of the study did not 
influence participant confidence.  
Discussion 
The first goal of this study was to compare Bayesian/information integration and story 
models of juror decision-making with the same experimental paradigm to determine which is 
used by mock jurors.  It was predicted that the story model is used over Bayesian and 
information integration models because it is better equipped to handle bias and assumes items of 
evidence are related to one another (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Wiener 
et al., 2002).  Different selection patterns among items of main evidence were expected between 
the conditions, and relationships were expected to exist between item guilt ratings and selection 
order.  There was no significant difference between conditions when looking at the first selected 
item, but there was a significant difference in selection pattern between the Guilty and Innocent 
conditions.  Physical evidence was selected second 34% of the time (eyewitness testimony was 
selected 66%) in the Guilty condition, while physical evidence was selected 68% of the time 
(eyewitness testimony was selected 32%) in the Innocent condition.  This suggest that different 
decision strategies were used during the decision-making process (Payne & Bettman, 1988), 
likely due to the bias originating from the narrative.  Different selection patterns suggest 
participants had different goals, or possibly different narratives, between the Guilty and Innocent 
conditions.  Story models assume multiple narratives are constructed during the decision-making 
process in an attempt to consolidate the information presented to them (Pennington & Hastie, 
1992; Wiener et al., 2002), and this finding supports the story model.  However, no significant 
differences were found between the first and third selection, and this suggests an independence 
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of items and condition, supporting the Bayesian/information integration assumption of 
independence (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985; Marshall & Wise, 1975; Rust et al., 1998; Schum & 
Du Charme, 1971).  Significant relationships were found between item guilt ratings and selection 
order across all conditions, suggesting an item’s weight influenced the evaluation of another 
items.  This also supports story over Bayesian/information integration models.  Guilty and 
innocent sub-evidence items were rated differently within each condition and differed by verdict, 
supporting the Bayesian/information integration assumption that items have their own weight 
that contributes to the final average (Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; Rust et al., 1998; Schum & Du 
Charme, 1971).  The results from this study suggest a combination of mathematical and 
explanation models are used, but the interpretation of results is more complex and may be 
attributable to the design of the study.  
The methodology of the study required participants to make decisions after viewing each 
sub-evidence item (24 guilt ratings per participant).  Story models make no assumption about 
item evaluation and how item weights are combined to reach a final verdict, but Bayesian and 
information integration models assume an averaging effect takes place as items are introduced.  
The results support the story model, but participants had to provide individual ratings for each 
sub-evidence item, thus requiring them to use the Bayesian model.  The methodology allowed 
participants to select items of main evidence and sub-evidence in any order they chose, and this 
allowed participants to construct their own narrative and use the story method.  However, the 
story model was overshadowed by the continued task of rating items.  To test Bayesian models, 
individuals have to give ratings after each item, so the methodology used in this study was 
predisposed to support the Bayesian model.  Interpretation of results is not clear because it 
cannot be determined with certainty what model was used by participants. 
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The second goal of the study was to investigate predecisional distortion and how it 
changed over time, while also accounting for order effects.  The juror decision-making models 
assessed in this study make no overt claims about bias or how it might be reflected in their 
design.  Bayesian and information integration models do not appear capable of accounting for 
bias (e.g., items are independent of one another), while story models, on the surface, appear 
better suited for it through the construction of narratives.  No significant associations were found 
between condition and verdict, and guilt ratings also did not significantly differ by condition.  
The bias introduced prior to evidence evaluation did not distort participant perception of the 
defendant, suggesting that predecisional distortion was not present (Dahlstrand & Montgomery, 
1984; Russo et al., 1996).  
These findings suggest bias systematically varies throughout the decision-making 
process.  One possible explanation is that the bias introduced in the narratives prior to evidence 
evaluation was not strong enough to sway verdict outcomes or guilt ratings.  However, the 
difference in selection order between physical evidence and eyewitness testimony suggest the 
bias was present following the initial narrative.  Another explanation stems from the 
methodology of the study.  Because participants provided guilt ratings after each sub-evidence 
item (24 guilt ratings per participant), it is possible that the bias presented at the beginning of the 
study was weakened or eliminated.  Bias occurs when individuals use quick judgements and do 
not critically evaluate the information presented to them.  Participants had to evaluate each sub-
evidence item, and it is possible that required ratings forced participants to engage in effortful 
thought and critically evaluate items, inoculating them from bias.  The inoculation effect has 
been compared to antibodies and disease resistance (Grande, 2016), and it is the idea that 
exposing oneself to a bias builds a tolerance and removes future influence from it (McGuire & 
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Papageorgis, 1962).  Frequent guilt ratings could have acted as an inoculation against the bias 
introduced at the beginning of the study, and it is possible that by the third selection order 
participants became inoculated (eight ratings are given by the third item of main evidence). 
An interesting observation was the change in average guilt for the innocent sub-evidence 
from the first selection to the last selection (Appendix E).  Guilty sub-evidence was rated 
consistently across selection order, and innocent sub-evidence had an increase in guilt across 
selection order (1st – 6th).  Condition did not have any significant effects on the guilt ratings, but 
guilty and innocent sub-evidence were rated differently within the conditions, revealing they 
were perceived differently by participants.  The increase in innocent sub-evidence guilt is likely 
not attributable to the bias introduced prior to evidence evaluation.  Bilz (2010) argued for an 
exclusionary aspect of the story model, stating that information that serves no evidential value or 
is an attempt to create empathy towards the defendant should be/is excluded by the juror. The 
sub-evidence used in this study (see Appendix A) included contradictory information and 
information that could be perceived as an attempt to gather empathy.  Participants may have 
evaluated the innocent sub-evidence in this manner and chose to ignore information that 
appeared to be unrelated to the crime itself (such as the defendant claiming he still loved his wife 
and wanted her back), and conflicting information between the eyewitness testimonies may have 
contributed to the increase in guilt.  Conflicting information has been found to impact decisions 
(Simons & Green, 2013), which could be related to multiple narratives being constructed during 
evidence evaluation (Wiener et al., 2002).  This could also be related to the difference in 
confidence ratings between Guilty and Innocent verdicts, but additional research is needed 
before any determinations can be made.  However, this doe not explain why Guilty sub-evidence 
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remained stable in ratings, and the difference between them may stem from criteria needed to 
make a final verdict.  Further research should explore this difference. 
There are some limitations of the present study that should be addressed.  First, the final 
verdict decision had Guilty/Innocent options, not Guilty/Not Guilty options. There is a legal 
difference between being found Guilty, Not Guilty, Innocent, and other verdict options.  It is 
possible that this difference in verdict options negated the relationship between the narrative read 
prior to evidence evaluation and verdict.  Second, participants did not receive any instructions 
about verdict criteria or how the verdicts differ, which is always provided to a jury before the 
start of a court trial.  The effect of jury instructions should be investigated in future studies, 
especially due to the difference in verdict options (Connelly, 1999; Hope, Greene, Memon, 
Gavisk, & Houston, 2008) and between reasonable doubt and confidence (Cicchini & White, 
2017; Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996). Finally, limitation in interpreting the results of this study 
stem from the methodology.  There is no other way to assess Bayesian decision-making models 
other than to have participants make ratings after each item.  Doing this in the current study 
forced participants to use Bayesian models, so it is difficult to separate Bayesian and story 
models.  To investigate whether the bias introduced at the beginning of the study is mitigated by 
conscious and effortful evaluation, guilt ratings should be removed. 
Juror decision-making is complex with multiple interacting components.  It is important 
to understand decision-making processes at the individual level so that group decision-making 
can be understood.  There are many factors known to influence juries, and it is not known how 
juror decision-making models account for these influences or if they accurately can.  Results 
from this study suggest a combination of mathematical and explanation models are used by mock 
jurors when evaluating evidence, but the methodology used does not allow for easy separation 
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between them.  Results also suggest bias introduced prior to evidence evaluation may be 
diminished or removed through effortful thought via guilt ratings, and a comparison study with 
guilt ratings removed is needed to know for sure if an inoculation effect occurs.    
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Appendix A 
Narratives and Items of Evidence 
N1 (Guilty):  A 911 call was made at approximately 10:00pm from a woman stating her 
daughter had been attacked.  The victim died due to multiple stab wounds to the body.  No 
suspect is immediately found. During a preliminary interview with the stepmother, detectives 
learn the victim recently went through a divorce.  The ex-husband is later charged with the 
crime.  Three eyewitnesses agreed to give testimonies, and there are three physical pieces of 
evidence related to the case.  
N2 (Innocent):  A 911 call was made at approximately 10:00pm from a woman stating her 
daughter had been attacked.  The victim died due to multiple stab wounds to the body.  No 
suspect is immediately found.  During a preliminary interview with the stepmother, detectives 
learn the victim had been separated from her husband for a long time and they were divorced 
three years ago.  However, the ex-husband is later charged with the crime.  Three eyewitnesses 
agreed to give testimonies, and there are three physical pieces of evidence related to the case. 
N3 (Neutral):  A 911 call was made at approximately 10:00pm from a woman stating her 
daughter had been attacked.  The victim died due to multiple stab wounds to the body.  No 
suspect is immediately found during a preliminary interview.  However, the ex-husband is later 
charged with the crime.  Three eyewitnesses agreed to give testimonies, and there are three 
physical pieces of evidence related to the case. 
Items of Evidence 
Eyewitness #1: Victim’s stepmother 
Victim returned home around 10:00 p.m. from the movies the night of the murder.  Her 
stepmother heard commotion outside and saw a man attack her daughter.  He immediately fled in 
a dark blue automobile identified as one similar to what the defendant owns.  
• The porch light was on and there was a full moon lending to an easier identification of 
the suspect 
• Due to the extended period of time that the stepmother has spent with her step-daughter’s 
ex-husband, she confidently identified his voice and stature  
• When the stepmother took a physical examination, it was found that she needed glasses.  
She reported that she was not wearing them during the time of the murder; therefore, her 
vision was not perfect 
• She was emotionally distressed during questioning which potentially influences the 
ability to engage in efficient recall. 
Eyewitness #2: Neighbor 
The neighbor from across the street corroborated the stepmother’s story.  She heard screaming 
from the stepmom and got out of bed and ran to the window to look.  She got to the window in 
time to see a man carrying an object run to a dark car and drive away.    
• The neighbor also took physical examinations and was found to have excellent vision.  
• The neighbor reported clearly recognizing the defendant’s build and hair style.  He had 
lived across the street for a number of years, and they have had numerous encounters.   
• The neighbor was groggy during questioning due to sleeping pills taken earlier that night.  
The grogginess may affect perception.   
• Due to the time of night, she could not positively identify the exact color or make of the 
car from her vantage point across the street. 
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Eyewitness #3: Bartender 
The bartender said that he had seen the defendant in the bar multiple evenings a week around the 
same time.  There was nothing unusual about tonight.  He was there for a few hours and left 
around 9:15 p.m.  He didn’t mention where he was going once he left. 
• The defendant complained about his failed marriage throughout the night at the bar. 
• The bartender was very confident in his identification due to the fact that the defendant 
had become a regular. 
• The bartender said the defendant was wearing a different outfit than what the stepmom 
and neighbor identified the suspect as wearing. 
• The bartender said that the defendant had previously mentioned how he wanted his wife 
back and still loved her.  
Physical evidence #1: Knife 
• Based on entrance wounds in the body, the knife was determined to be a 6-inch serrated 
hunting knife.  The same sort of knife was found at defendant’s house. 
• The knife found at his house was just recently cleaned.  
• The entry wounds in the body had been probed during an earlier autopsy so the precise 
comparison with the serrated knife was impossible. 
• The defendant was an avid hunter, and a knife of that type would not be uncommon to 
find in the house of any hunter. 
Physical evidence #2: Footprint  
• A photograph of a bloody shoeprint was taken from the crime scene, and the prints 
matched shoes that the defendant owns. 
• Partial fingerprints were taken from the railing around where the shoeprint was found, 
and some matched the defendant’s.  However, he used to live there, so it can’t be 
determined to be from that night. 
• This type of shoe could also belong to thousands of other men. 
• No traceable blood was found on the defendant’s shoes. 
Physical evidence #3: Car 
• Tire marks found on the road outside of the victim’s house match the tread from factory 
installed tires, which are the same type of tires found on the defendant’s car.   
• Soil taken from crime scene had similar characteristics with dirt that was taken from his 
car a few days after the murder. 
• Someone else had stated seeing his car across town around the same time as the murder 
which would place him in different location and unable to commit the crime. 
• The defendant claims that the dirt could have been from any time before or after the 
murder. He’s always around that area hunting. 
  





Figure 1.  Example experimental overview of the neutral narrative with the knife selected first, 
followed by the autopsy sub-evidence.  The process is repeated for all sub-evidence and main 
items. 
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Appendix C 
Table 1 




Guilty (n = 35) Innocent (n = 31) Neutral (n = 27) Total (N = 93) 
Guilty 22 17 16 55 
Innocent 13 14 11 38 
Note. ꭓ2 (2) = .438, p = .803 (two-tailed). 
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Appendix D 
Table 2 
Percent Physical and Eyewitness Evidence Selected by Condition 
  Selection Order 
Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Guilty       
Physical 86% 34% 57% 34% 49% 40% 
Eyewitness 14% 66% 43% 66% 51% 60% 
Innocent 
      
Physical 68% 68% 45% 48% 35% 35% 
Eyewitness 32% 32% 55% 52% 65% 65% 
Neutral 
      
Physical 70% 52% 48% 41% 48% 41% 
Eyewitness 30% 48% 52% 59% 52% 59% 
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Appendix E 
Table 3 
Sub-Evidence Guilt Rating by Selection Order 
           Selection Order 
 Type 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
    Innocent 3.73 1.62 3.56 1.77 3.97 1.7 3.85 1.62 3.92 1.69 4.35 1.64 
    Guilty 5.82 1.94 5.89 1.66 6.09 1.85 6.15 1.78 6.28 1.74 6.02 1.53 
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Appendix F 
Table 4 


























.262*           
2nd 
Guilty 
           
2nd 
Innocent 
 .312** .284**         
3rd 
Guilty 
  .301**         
3rd 
Innocent 
   .445** .380**       
4th 
Guilty 
  .362**  .282** .242*      
4th 
Innocent 
 .295**  .567**  .423** .262*     
5th 
Guilty 
  .243* .243* .391**  .458** .304*    
5th 
Innocent 
 .295**  .386**  .430**  .522** .328**   
6th 
Guilty 
.209*      .213* .247* .372** .225*  
6th 
Innocent 
  .249*   .395**   .346**  .438** .31** .490** .517** 
Note. N = 93, *p < .05 (2-tailed), **p < .001 (2-tailed). 
 
